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Abstract
Syndromic surveillance is a form of surveillance that generates information for public health
action by collecting, analysing and interpreting routine health-related data on symptoms and
clinical signs reported by patients and clinicians rather than being based on microbiologically
or clinically confirmed cases. In England, a suite of national real-time syndromic surveillance
systems (SSS) have been developed over the last 20 years, utilising data from a variety of health
care settings (a telehealth triage system, general practice and emergency departments). The
real-time systems in England have been used for early detection (e.g. seasonal influenza),
for situational awareness (e.g. describing the size and demographics of the impact of a heat-
wave) and for reassurance of lack of impact on population health of mass gatherings (e.g. the
London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games).We highlight the lessons learnt from running
SSS, for nearly two decades, and propose questions and issues still to be addressed. We feel
that syndromic surveillance is an example of the use of ‘big data’, but contend that the
focus for sustainable and useful systems should be on the added value of such systems and
the importance of people working together to maximise the value for the public health of syn-
dromic surveillance services.
Introduction: the practical value of syndromic surveillance
Syndromic surveillance is a form of surveillance that generates information for public health
action by collecting, analysing and interpreting routine health-related data. Most commonly
these data are symptoms and clinical signs reported by patients and clinicians rather than
being based on microbiologically or clinically confirmed cases [1].When syndromic surveil-
lance systems (SSS) were first established in the mid-1990s [2, 3], there was a particular
emphasis on the monitoring of influenza activity and a further impetus because of the poten-
tial utility for the early detection of bioterrorist events in the wake of the terrorist attack in the
USA in September 2001 [4].
In England, a suite of national real-time SSS have been developed incrementally since 1998,
utilising data from a variety of health care settings (a telehealth triage system, general practice
and emergency departments). These systems use descriptive methods and bespoke statistical
modelling [5, 6] to detect a higher consultation/call activity than expected compared with his-
torical trend data by syndrome and geography. If such increases are assessed to have potential
public health implications, then the syndromic surveillance team alert public health colleagues
in order to take public health action (Box 1) [7].
In England, key influenza-related indicators have been developed and SSS are used each win-
ter for influenza surveillance and, alongside other sources of health intelligence including micro-
biological testing, play an important role in describing the onset of activity, spread and impact of
influenza on the population each season. The SSS provide particular value in describing the
impact of influenza on a variety of health care settings and were widely used to detect and moni-
tor the H1N1(pdm09) pandemic (Box 2) [8]. Over the years the systems have been used to
monitor the impact of a wide range of infectious and non-infectious hazards including seasonal
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norovirus activity, heatwaves, extreme cold weather, mass gather-
ings, air pollution events (Box 2) [9–12]. During the London
2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, the SSS were used daily
alongside enhanced microbiological and event-based surveillance
to detect public health incidents, and also to particularly provide
reassurance about lack of outbreaks across London and the rest
England (Box 2) [13, 14]. Over recent years, the English SSS
have also been used to monitor the impact on the population of
the introduction of new vaccine programmes, e.g. rotavirus vaccine
for infants in England and the subsequent impact on reducing GP
consultations for gastroenteritis [15].
In summary, the real-time systems in England have been used
for early detection (e.g. seasonal influenza and to support
response planning), for situational awareness (e.g. describing the
size and demographics of the impact of a heatwave) and for
reassurance of lack of impact on population health of mass gath-
erings (e.g. the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games).
There has been considerable emphasis in the literature on the
statistical methodologies and algorithms used to underpin SSS,
with much of this work using synthetic and modelled data
[16–20]. In addition, there are a number of publications on the detec-
tion of discrete events, e.g. cryptosporidiosis outbreaks. However, lit-
tle has been published on the practical experience of establishing and
operating such systems, and on how the outputs of SSS can be
integrated into wider public health action and response.
In this review, we aim to highlight the lessons learnt from run-
ning SSS, for nearly two decades, and propose questions and issues
still to be addressed. The authors include those who have commis-
sioned SSS; led the design, implementation and maintenance of the
systems; and the ‘end users’ of the outputs including national inci-
dent directors, and the opinions are a synthesis of their experience
and views. We focus on lessons learnt from the English systems,
but refer to SSS in other countries where relevant.
Lessons learnt for syndromic surveillance
Whilst developing and using SSS, we have learnt a number of les-
sons which may be of value for those planning for, establishing
and maintaining such systems. We have divided these lessons
into those relating to the purpose and aims of SSS, relationships
with colleagues and infrastructure of SSS.
Lessons: purpose and aims
In lessons relating to purpose and aims, we highlight the import-
ance of: integration of SSS within a public health system, public
health colleagues driving the systems and SSS being multi-purpose.
Although there has been much emphasis in the literature on
analytical methodologies and algorithms [16–20], which are
important for ensuring the routine operation of SSS, it is essential
that the primary focus should remain on the public health utility
of these systems. Surveillance has been defined as providing ‘infor-
mation for action’ and so it is important that the information pro-
duced by SSS is integrated within a public health system, which is
able to take appropriate public health action as a result of the infor-
mation generated, e.g. in Public Health England, the Real-time
Syndromic Surveillance Team (ReSST) is part of the organisation
which is able to take national and local public health action if an
outbreak/incident is detected. In this way, SSS do not ‘stand-alone’
as ‘databases’, collecting data and generating statistical alarms, but
rather are an integral part of a managed public health system.
The connection between SSS operators and their public health sta-
keholders is key to ensuring that public health action needs to drive
the scope and outputs of SSS. The SSS complement and augment a
variety of traditional surveillance systems in order to provide wider
intelligence about a public health issue or incident, e.g. early warn-
ing, or a more granular picture geographically or by age.
Sustainable systems (those which operate over a sustained per-
iod of time, are flexible and not established solely for a discrete
event) focus on the needs of public health personnel who may
make use of the syndromic surveillance outputs. The supporting
data and SSS follow: they are not the initial drivers for the surveil-
lance systems. For example, during the London 2012 Olympic and
Paralympic Games, the development of an emergency department
SSS was given a higher priority because of the need to establish if
visitors to the Games (particularly international visitors who may
Box 1: Overview of the Public Health England syndromic surveillance service
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Box 2: Selected examples of the public health use of English syndromic surveillance systems
Weekly GP consultation rate of influenza-like illness during the early and peak phase of the H1N1(pdm09) pandemic across England.
Extract from daily syndromic surveillance Olympic report illustrating reassurance of no public health threats.
Increases in emergency department attendances for asthma/wheeze/difficulty breathing symptoms during two air pollution episodes, 2014.
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not consult a general practitioner) became ill and required emer-
gency care [21]. In a similar need-driven way, the emergency
department surveillance system in France followed the necessity
(identified in the 2003 heatwave) to monitor, in real-time, the
extreme effects of heat [22]. Therefore, while in both these
instances, the individual events gave impetus to (and resources
for) the development of the systems (with both continuing to pro-
vide surveillance for a wide range of public health threats), a general
public health need can also be a driver for developing such systems.
We advocate that real-time SSS should be designed and oper-
ated to serve multiple public health objectives and not established
for a single disease/discrete mass gathering, as once established
the inherent nature of syndrome-based reporting has wider utility.
An increase in ‘difficulty breathing’ in a population may indicate
an infection, but may also indicate an air pollution event – thus
the surveillance team need to be linked with a variety of health
protection practitioners to provide intelligence widely.
Often forgotten is the need for reassurance about lack of
impact on the public’s health of an event or mass gathering.
Such reassurance is frequently required throughout an event
and in real-time for highly publicised events: real-time syndromic
surveillance can provide information that forms a key component
of this reassurance. This is valued by those managing the public
health response to the events [14].
Lessons: importance of relationships
For sustainable and successful SSS, we argue that relationships are
of crucial importance, both with the data providers and with the
public health users of surveillance outputs. Yet their importance is
rarely described in the literature.
Similar to some traditional surveillance systems such as
laboratory surveillance, the relationship between SSS and data
providers is crucial to a well-functioning system, and understand-
ing the nature of this relationship is key. For example, in England
the role of the National Health Service (NHS) 111 telehealth tri-
age service is to safely manage and triage callers who need advice
about subsequent care, not to perform public health surveillance
(i.e. provide data for SSS). Often anonymised data are transferred
by such data providers to the syndromic surveillance team for the
‘public good’ and at no cost to the syndromic surveillance team.
Thus, trust between the data provider and the syndromic surveil-
lance team is important, and needs to be proactively worked
upon/strengthened (we undertake this by regular contact and
joint steering meetings with the data providers, and ensuring
that the data providers are fully aware of how the data are being
used). The syndromic surveillance activity needs to be mutually
beneficial for the data provider and the syndromic surveillance
team; the data providers need to be assured about data security
and that the syndromic surveillance team will not compromise
the data providers by releasing interpretation on/raw data without
the providers being aware of this. It is possible that one breach of
trust/release of data undermining the data providers could disable
a SSS. We feel this issue of relationships and trust between teams
is seldom mentioned in the field of syndromic surveillance but is
fundamental to underpinning sustainable systems.
The links between SSS and public health users of such data are
also critical and outputs from a syndromic system should rarely
stand alone. In order to provide interpretation of outputs, the syn-
dromic team need to have good ongoing relationships with dis-
ease experts, or those public health colleagues leading an
incident. It is important to strike the right balance in the
interpretation of SSS outputs, reflecting the strengths of the
immediacy of the signals generated but also the limitations with
regards to aetiological specificity. Thus, e.g. syndromic surveil-
lance outputs should not purport to provide unilateral interpret-
ation on the impact of a flooding incident (for which other
intelligence is available such as microbiological surveillance
reports and situational reports of local outbreaks), but rather
should be included as a part of an integrated output by those lead-
ing the incident response. However, an incident director still
needs an output from the syndromic surveillance service which
is interpreted by epidemiologists with syndromic surveillance
knowledge and working within a public health context. A line
list of multiple statistical alarms for multiple syndromes will be
of little help to a busy incident director, and in the planning for
the 2012 Games, this was emphasised by those leading the public
health response and was addressed by the introduction of a
syndromic surveillance risk assessment system [7, 14].
Lessons: surveillance system ‘infrastructure’
SSS inevitably vary in the resources that are required/available to
run the systems. We have previously stressed that the focus should
be on the public health utility. In order for this to happen, there
should be input from conception of the SSS from those with clin-
ical and public health/epidemiological and statistical expertise in
addition to those with informatics and information technology
expertise. We feel that the value of the integrated whole is greater
than the sum of the parts for those systems encompassing these
complementary disciplines.
The provision of health care services across the world differs. In
England, health care provision is via the NHS and is free at the
point of delivery. This is fortuitous for syndromic surveillance in
that we are able to work with health service managers to obtain
national real-time data (e.g. NHS 111 data encompass the whole
of England). This is additionally helpful for surveillance as we
only need to negotiate with one organisation, even if other stake-
holders need to be consulted, and is a public service that has public
health responsibilities in addition to clinical ones (in contrast with
countries with numerous private providers of clinical services).
From experience, once the data governance requirements
(including data sharing agreements) are in place to support
ongoing access to syndromic datasets, it is key that nothing add-
itional is requested from health care data providers; this assures
sustainable and resilient systems. For example, we do not ask
health care staff to code differently, use additional codes or to pro-
vide additional details about risk factors. Feedback from data pro-
viders suggests that any additional burden placed on front-line
healthcare providers will result in an unsustainable system that
will not deliver data. To prevent this, we ensure that the extraction
and transfer of surveillance data is automated and occurs in the
background of the service provider system, thus not interfering
with, or adding additional time to the health care consultation.
One size, however, does not fit all. SSS in individual countries
will depend upon their health care infrastructure, and long-term
systems need to build upon the data resources available. For
example, countries with city-wide health care organisations often
have city-wide surveillance systems; and in developing countries/
those countries with changing health care infrastructure, social
media-type syndromic surveillance (which is not dependent on
health care infrastructure) may have particular value.
With ever-increasing data available, there is the tendency to
focus on more and more data analyses and on algorithms as
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part of the SSS infrastructure. We suggest the focus should pri-
marily be on the questions and use for real-time syndromic sur-
veillance, and the acquisition of larger and more diverse datasets
and algorithms should follow to support, rather than the surveil-
lance being driven by the data sources.
Questions and issues still to be tackled in syndromic
surveillance
We have divided these questions/issues into those relating to the
purpose and aims of, relationships with colleagues and infrastruc-
ture of SSS.
Issues still to be tackled: purpose of SSS
Much of the available syndromic surveillance literature is about
public health incidents that have been detected by SSS or a
description about the health impact of incidents. There is little lit-
erature about the types or characteristics of incidents/outbreaks
which cannot be detected by SSS and the detection limitations.
We need to be clearer with public health colleagues about the
detection capabilities and limits of existing SSS.
To do this, we need to develop suitable methods for assessing
the sensitivity and specificity of SSS. For example, when describ-
ing the performance of a single laboratory test for a single organ-
ism, it is relatively easy to calculate and communicate a measure
of sensitivity and specificity. In comparison, for a SSS measuring
multiple syndromic indicators (ranging from vomiting to con-
junctivitis) for a variety of diseases of public health importance,
this becomes much more complex. There needs to be a method-
ology for the calculation of sensitivity, specificity and positive
predictive value which could be used across different types of
SSS in a variety of countries and for different syndromes and
diseases.
We feel there should be an increased clarity with public health
users of information from syndromic systems about the types of
condition which are amenable for monitoring/detection via syn-
dromic surveillance. One important aspect to consider is the spe-
cificity and sensitivity of the clinical syndrome being reported for
the specific disease that one may wish to draw conclusions for.
For example, monitoring ‘hay fever’ (and codes which may be
indicative, e.g. allergic rhinitis) gives a useful indication of sea-
sonal trends in allergic rhinitis. Many conditions may present,
or be coded initially, in a more non-specific way (e.g. people
with Legionnaires’ disease could present with, and thus be
coded by clinicians as cough/chest pain or difficulty breathing
or headache or fever or a combination; conversely Legionnaires’
disease is likely to be a minor component of people presenting
with ‘cough’ or ‘difficulty breathing’). Most syndromic systems
will not be able to detect an early increase in, or reliably identify
trends in such diversely presenting diseases or attribute any
observed increase to a specific disease – and laboratory confirm-
ation remains the mainstay of surveillance for such diseases.
Additionally, SSS were originally developed for the purpose of
detecting bioterrorist and deliberate release events. While this
purpose remains important, there needs to be clear understanding
of the utility of these systems in detecting such incidents. Very few
SSS are likely to be able to detect small numbers of early cases
arising from exposure to a biological or chemical agent, particu-
larly when they present diversely in terms of their clinical and
epidemiological characteristics.
Most SSS demonstrate what is happening now or over the pre-
vious days. The incident cases are frequently compared with those
expected for the time of year to understand seasonal trends,
increases in activity, etc. This information is of help for those run-
ning health care systems, but what may be of increased value is
forecasting the potential impact of short-term changes in the
disease burden or clinical activity on other parts of the health
care system in the near future, e.g. using telehealth cough calls
to predict subsequent increases in hospitalisations for pneumonia.
Work exploring practical forecasting using conditions monitored
by SSS is still in its infancy. Yet if SSS are shown to be of value in
forecasting, the real-time nature of SSS could make such short-
term predictions of great value for those managing surges in,
and seasonal pressures across, health care services, e.g. in prepar-
ing the health and care services for upsurges of influenza-like ill-
ness or viral gastroenteritis.
Issues still to be tackled: importance of relationships
The English SSS are based upon data which are not mandated, and
under clear governance arrangements (between those running the
syndromic systems and those providing the health care usage data)
that the data are to be used for public health purposes only. Those
running SSS are often asked for the ‘raw data’ by a variety of orga-
nisations, e.g. academia, health care providers, media, etc. There is
thus a balance between the drive for data openness and sharing,
with data providers who may not be willing to provide the data
for SSS if they then have no control over the subsequent use
and interpretation, and their data are simply ‘posted’ by those run-
ning SSS. This balance and agreement about subsequent data shar-
ing, if handled incorrectly, could undermine systems, and thus
needs to be clearly agreed and constantly reviewed.
Issues still to be tackled: surveillance system ‘infrastructure’
Many countries have SSS, and in some, these systems are multi-
setting (encompassing, e.g. GP attendances, emergency depart-
ment attendances and telehealth calls). What is unclear is how
many SSS is ‘enough’ in terms of data feeds for a comprehensive,
optimally performing and cost-effective syndromic surveillance
service. As more potential data streams become available, there
needs to be clarity about added value of new potential sources,
e.g. social media and Internet search data, and indeed whether
some syndromic data sources could be dis-established because
they add little to the public health intelligence. There is also little
consensus on how to combine multiple data streams to get the
maximum intelligence from a number of different data sources
(e.g. ambulance dispatch data and out of hours general practice
consultations) and across multiple syndromes (e.g. can cough in
one system be usefully combined with fever from another).
The commonly used definition of syndromic surveillance is
quite long; however, it does include a good description of the pur-
pose and potential data sources [23]. There needs to be some con-
sistency and increased rigor in the literature about the use of the
term. The term syndromic surveillance has been used to describe
work to explore the statistical relationship between presenting
symptoms (often based on modelled data) and theoretical
potential detection capabilities, which have not been acted upon
(because the work is theoretical). We contend that there should
be a clearer distinction between this type of modelled theoretical
work and SSS working in practice. Such SSS use ongoing, often
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passive data collection, but actively support public health actions
as part of a wider public health service.
Summary
Real-time syndromic surveillance is not new and now forms a com-
ponent of the surveillance for communicable and environmental
diseases, and for situations that have the potential to impact
adversely on the public’s health, in many countries. SSS is however
still in its infancy compared with traditional surveillance methods.
It is still evolving and we have much to learn about where SSS adds
value and where it does not. Most literature in this area is about
data, algorithms and potential detection capabilities (often using
synthetic data). We now need to move on to defining the public
health needs for SSS and designing systems to best meet those
needs. We feel that SSS is a good example of the use of large data-
sets, but contend that the focus for sustainable and useful systems
should primarily be on the added value of such systems and the
importance of people working together to maximise the value for
the public health of syndromic surveillance services.
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